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INTERPRETING AN UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION
RoNALD

D.

RoTUNDA •

It is frequently said in jest that one of the important things
we share with the British is that we each live under an "unwritten Constitution." This point was well illustrated when a major
casebook on American constitutional law was published without reprinting the Constitution. 1 Some have suggested that
perhaps the editors felt no need for law students to look at the
Constitution because the Justices themselves seldom did.
The "unwritten Constitution" encompasses those rights and
freedoms thought by many people, particularly judges, to be
basic to our democratic way of life, but which are not explicitly
defined by the written document. While the Soviet Constitution
expressly provides for rights of "guaranteed work, health protection, .[and] education, " 2 our Constitution reserves to the
people a different class of rights. For instance, we may vote irrespective of race 3 or gender, 4 and we enjoy "the freedom of
speech [and] of the press." 5 The people can then use the right
to vote and the right of free speech and other rights, in conjunction with the legislative process, to enact laws providing for
such things as worker's compensation, 6 medical payments, 7
public education, 8 and social security benefits 9
*

Profe~sor of Law, University of Illinois.
J. Seej. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLICY (1975).
The first supplement to that edition and subsequent editions reprinted the
Constitution.
2. KoNST. SSSR c. 7, arts. 39-45 (USSR), reprinted in BASIC DocuMENTS ON THE So-

VIET LEGAL SYSTEM (W. Butler ed. & trans. 1983).
3. U.S. CaNST. amend. XV,§ l.
4. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIX, § l.
5. U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
6. See, e.g., N.Y. WoRK. CaMP. LAW§§ 10-34 (McKinney 1988).
7. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21,97 Stat. 65,65-

172, {codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (Supp. IV 1986)).
8. See, e.g., The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89IO, 79 Stat. 27, 27-58 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)).
9. See, e.g., Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98460,98Stat.ll70, 1794-l814(codifiedasamendedat42U.S.C. §§ l381-I383c(l982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
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Our Constitution both establishes and limits government.
Like the Mayflower Compact, 10 one part is structural in form.
The system of "checks and balances," whereby one branch limits and is limited by another, reflects eighteenth-century fascination with Newtonian scientific thought.'' The remainder of
our Constitution is written in the "Thou shalt not" form, much
like the Magna Carta. 12 This portion of the Constitution is the
primary embodiment of enumerated rights, including the prohibition that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," 13 and the guarantee that no person shall
"be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." 14 The list is well known. The Supreme Court, when it
attempts to interpret the Constitution, has at its disposal these
and other enumerated rights phrased in magnificent generalities. Why is it necessary, then, for the Court to look to an "unwritten Constitution"? And, if the Court does turn to an
unwritten Constitution, will it be worth the paper it is printed
on?
For much of its history, the Supreme Court has purportedly
engaged in "interpretive" judicial review. 15 Interpretive review
occurs when the Court
ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by
reference to one of the value judgments of which the Constitution consists-that is, by reference to a value judgment
10. The Compact provides:
We whose names are underwritten . . do by these presents, solemnly and
mutually, in the presence of God and one of another, covenant, and combine
ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact,
constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions,
offices from time to time as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the
general good of the Colony; unto which we promise all due submission and
obedience.
The Mayflower Compact, reprinted in THE MAYFLOWER CoMPACT AND ITs SIGNERS 6 (G.
Bowman 1920).
II. Woodrow Wilson likened the balance of "checks and coumerpoises" to a system
"which Newton might readily have recognized as suggestive of the mechanism of the
heavens." W. WILSON, CoNSTlTUTJONAL GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908).
12. For example, a provision of the Magna Carta provides, "No man shall be com~
pelled to perform more service for a knight's fee or for any other free tenement than is
due therefrom." Magna Carta c. 16, reprinted in]. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323 (1965).
13. U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
14. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
15. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what. the law is.
Those who apply the rule for particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule."); see alw J GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS To 1801 at 554-68, 580-84 (1971).
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embodied, though not necessarily explicitly, either in some
particular provision of the text of the Constitution or in
the overall structure of government ordained by the
Constitution. 16

Even prominent non-interpretivists have acknowledged that
the legitimacy of interpretive review is quite easily justified. 17
However, in recent years a growing number of commentators have urged the courts to rely on non-interpretive values in
deciding cases of constitutional law. 18 The justification for noninterpretive review is more troublesome. Its proponents posit
cheerfully that judges should adopt values not found in, influenced by, or derived from the constitutional text or the logic of
precedent 1 9 These advocates would blithely grant the courts
unbridled power, arguing that the judiciary is "the voice and
conscience of contemporary society." 20 In this "more candidly
creative role," 21 judges find the "right answers" from appropriate moral and political values in order to go "beyond the value
judgments established by the framers of the written Constitution (extraconstitutional policymaking) ." 22 The Constitution is
no longer viewed as a blueprint for allocating and limiting government power; rather, judicial review is simply a tool that
judges use to forge an ideal society-or at least what these
judges view as an ideal society. Thus, "the highest mission of
the Supreme Court ... is not to conserve judicial credibility,
but in the Constitution's own phrase, 'to form a more perfect
Union.' " 23
When judges look outside the Constitution, they ultimately
look inside themselves. To illustrate this abstract principle, let
16. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTfON, THE Cot:RTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE jUDICIARY 10 (1982)
(footnote omitted); see also Palmer, The Fedeml Common Law ofChme, 4 L. & HrsT. REV.
267, 269 (1986); 2 R. RoTUNDA, N. NoWAK, &J. YouNG, TREATISE oN CoNSTITUTWNAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE§§ 23.1-23.38 (1986).
17. SeeM. PERRY, supra note 16, at II, "No contemporary constitutional theorist seriously disputes the leg·irimacy of interpretive review." Moreover, Perry has admitted
that "[c]ertainly [non-interpretive review] cannot bejustifted on the basis of either the
constitutional text or the intentions of the framers." !d. at 43.
18. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 16.
19. See id.; see also infra notes 20-21.
. 20. The excerpt is from a court brief mentioned in an artide by then Associate Justtce William Rehnquist. See Rehnquist, The Xotion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. LREV.
693, 695 (1976); see also R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977); Parker, The
Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. LJ. 223 (1981).
2!. L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (lst ed. !978).
22. M. PERRY, sujJra note 16, at ix-x (emphasis omit.ted)·, see also id. at 101-14.
23. L. TRIBE., w.pm note 21, at iv.
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us consider a specific case, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.24 In that case a strongly divided Court (five to four) invalidated a state law to the extent that it conflicted with a
Connecticut Republican Party rule that permitted independent
voters to vote in Republican primaries for federal and statewide offices. The state law provided for a closed primary; the
Republican party rules provided for an open primary for federal and state-wide offices but a closed primary for other offices
(e.g., state legislator, mayor). 25 The state law providing for a
closed primary was hardly unusual or restrictive; it allowed a
previously unaffiliated voter to become eligible to vote in the
Party's primary simply by enrolling as a Party member as late as
noon on the last business day preceding the primary 26
Why did the Party reject the state law and draw such peculiar
distinctions? The opinions in Tashjian do not disclose what motivated this unique party rule. However, searching deep in the
lower court record, we learn that the Republican United States
Senator from Connecticut was concerned that he would not
win his party's primary without an influx of non-Republican
voters. Because other Republican candidates did not want independents voting in their primary, a compromise rule limited
independent voting to statewide offices. 27
Out of such prosaic concerns, the Supreme Court majority
fashions a new constitutional right of a political party. This
right was not easily created, because it appeared to conflict with
earlier precedent. In 1976 a three-judge court had upheld the
very same Connecticut dosed-primary law when an independent voter sought a declaratory judgment that he had a right to
vote in the Republican primary. The Supreme Court summarily
affirmed that decision in Nader v. Schajfer 28
The Tashjian Court specifically approved Schaffer's enforcement of the slate's dosed primary statute 29 , but Justice Marshall, for the Court, distinguished the earlier case on the
ground that it was brought by independent voters, not by the
24. 479 u.s. 208 (1986).
25. /d. at 211 nn.l-2.
26. !d. at 216 n.7.

27. The plaintiffs admitted this fact. See 3 R. RoTUNDA,]. NoWAK,
TISE oN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: SuBsTANCE

&

PRoCEDURE§

20.41,

at

&.J. YouNG, TREA22 (Supp. 1988).

28. 429 U.S. 989 (l976), summarily afl'g 417 F. Supp. 837 (D.Conn. 1976).
29. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 212.
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Republican Party 30 The Tashjian Court reasoned that in Schaffer
"the non-member's desire to participate in the party's affairs is
overborne by the countervailing and legitimate right of the
party to determine its own membership qualifications." 31 Thus
it was of constitutional dimension that the Republican Party itself objected to the state law. The Court concluded that the
Connecticut law at issue in Tashjian
impermissibly burdens the right of [Party] members to determine for themselves with whom they will associate, and
whose support they will seek, in their quest for political success. The Party's attempt to broaden the base of public
participation in and support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of association. 32

The Court cited no constitutional provision supporting this
surprising conclusion. 33 Could a political party exclude blacks
in an effort to pursue its political goals? The majority did say
that the members of a political party have a constitutional right
"to determine for themselves with whom they will associate,"
but surely it did not mean exactly that.
Justice Marshall found that "[t]he Party's determination of
the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure
which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by
the Constitution." 34 Because he eoncluded that "[t]he interests
which the [state] adduces in support of the statute are insubstantial" and not "compelling," 35 the Court declared the statute, as applied to the party, unconstitutional.
l believe in freedom of association just as much as the next
person. It is a right derived easily fi·om the First Amendment.
The leading case in the area is Roberts v. United States jaycees, 36
which affirmed state power to regulate large non-intimate associations, while recognizing that the power diminishes as the
30. !d. at 215-16 n.6.
31. !d.
32. !d. at 215-16.
33. The Court did recognize, of course, the freedom of association implied from the
First Amendment when it noted that "the freedom to join together in furtherance of
common political beliefs 'necessarily presupposes the freedom 10 identify the people
who constitute the association,'" thereby implicating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. !d. at 214 (quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S.
107, 122 (1981)). But the Schaffer decision had not rejected the right of freedom of
association, and it approved of the dosed-primary law.
34. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224. He also argued, somewhat inconsistently, that the act
of registering as a Republican was a significant public act of affiliation. See id. at n. 7.
35. /d. at 225.
36. 468

u.s.

609 (1984).
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association becomes more private-' 7 Significantly, the Tashjian
Court never cited Roberts. Had the Tashjian Court applied the
Roberts rationale, it would have upheld the constitutionality of
the Connecticut statute as a permissible state regulation of a
large, non-intimate association. A state-wide or national party
is hardly an intimate association like marriage. In fact, the
Court has approved of many instances in which states have legitimately regulated political parties in an effort to maintain a
democratic balance. 38 The majority did not distinguish, or even
37. The Roberts decision involved two Minnesota chapters of the United States
Jaycees, which had incurred sanctions and faced revocation of their charters because
they admitted women contrary to the national governing bylaws. The chapters filed
discrimination charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, alleging that
the exclusion of women from full membership violated the state Human Rights Act,
which made it an "unfair discriminatory practice ... [t]o deny any person the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accomodation.s of a place of public accomodation because of race, color, creed, religion,
disability, national origin, or sex." 468 U.S. at 615.
In finding the Act constitutional as applied to the Jaycees, the Court stated:
[T]he Bill of Rights ... must afford the formation and preservation of certain
kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State .
. . . fO]nly relationships with lintimar.e] qualities are likely to reflect the con*
siderations that have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an
intrinsic element of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lacking these
qualities-such as a large business enterprise-seems remote from r.he con·
cerns giving rise to this constiLUtional protection. Accordingly, the Constitu·
tion undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the
selection of one's spouse that would not. apply to regulations affecting the
choice of one's fellow employees.
Jd. at 618·20 (citations omitted).
38. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (California one-year disaffiliation
statute held constitut.ional as furthering State's interest in promoting stability and discouraging confusion in the political system); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752
(1973) (New York election law requiring party enrollment prior to general election in
order to vote in subsequent party primary, held constitutional as least restrictive means
of preventing raiding). But see Anderson v. Celebreue, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (Ohio stat·
ute requiring independent candidate for President to file petition and statement of can·
didacy at calculated date prior to primary in order to appear on later general election
ballot, held unconstitutional as burdening association rights of candidate and support·
ers, against asserted State interest of maintaining political stability); Democratic Party
of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (Wisconsin electoral statute man·
dating results of primary determine allOcation of votes cast by state's delegates at National Convention, contrary to party's own rules, held violative of Constitution
notwithstanding State's asserted compelling interests of preserving oyerall integrity of
electoral process, secrecy in balloting, and increased voter participation); Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (Jllinois voting statute held to unconstitutionally infringe
First Amendment by locking voter in pre-existing party affiliation for 23·month period
following participation in any primary election, despite state's asserted legitimate inter·
est in preventing raiding); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Ohio election law
rendering nearly impossible ballot qualification of any party other than Democratic or
Republican held violative of equal protection, despite the claimed state interest in promoting two-party system, encourag-ing political stability and compromise, and control·
ling multitudinous ffagmentary groups).
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mention, either Roberts or other cases upholding such regulation. As the dissent pointed out:
Connecticut may lawfully require that significant elements of
the democratic election process be democratic-whether the

Party wants that or not. It is beyond my understanding why
the Republican Party's delegation of its democratic choice to
the Republican Convention can be proscribed, but its delegation of that choice to nonmembers of the Party cannot. 39

Tashjian is but one example of a majority of the Court abandoning the written Constitution, turning instead to the "unwritten Constitution" and the Justices' own view of good
policy 40 Maybe the case could have been grounded in the Constitution and precedent, but the majority made no effort to do
so.
Even proponents of a "natural law" theory of the Constitution appreciate that there must be some limitations to judicial
power. If the Constitution does not provide those bounds,
something else must. Professor Michael Perry, a leading noninterpretivist, has argued that these parameters exist in a limited power of Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of the
courts." 1 Yet once Congress exercises a statutory power to
overrule in effect constitutional decisions by restricting jurisdiction, have we not gone a long way towards weakening judicial review? 42 Once Congress drinks of such powers, I fear that
39. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215~6 n.6 (Scalia, J, dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ.,
and O'Connor, J). The dissent added:
Appellee's only complaint is that the Party cannot leave the seleClion of its
candidates to person.s who are not members of the Pan.y, and are unwilling to
become members. It seems to me fanciful to refer to this as an interest in
freedom of association between the members of the Republican Party and the
putative independent voters .... [Moreover,] even if it were the fact that the
majority of the Party's members wanted its candidates to be determined by
OU(siders, there is no reason why the State is bound to honor that desire- any
more than it would be bound to honor a party's democratically expressed desire that its candidates henceforth be selected by convention rather than by
primary, or by the party's executive committee in a smoke-filled room.
!d. at 235-7 (emphasis in original).
40. Even conservative Courts have created new rights from the "unwritten Constitution." See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915); Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (l897).
41. SeeM. PERRY, supra note !6, at 128-38.
42. Professor Strong has suggested this point. See Strong, Foreboding Fissures in the
Bedrock of Popular Sovereignty, 59 No. CAR. L. REv. 599, 603 n. 21 (1981). On the power
of Congress to control the jurisdinion of the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts, and the constitutional limitations on that power, see 1 R. ROTUNDA,]. NowAK, &
j. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE§§ 2.10-2.11
(1986).
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it will act like the little boy who said that he knew how to spell
"banana," but did not know when to stop.
:Several years ago, Justice William Brennan urged, 'Justices
are not platonic guardians appointed to wield authority according to their personal moral predilections." 43 Even earlier, Justice Hugo Black warned us that when the Justices stray from the
written Constitution and rely on "natural rights," they "degrade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and
simultaneously appropriate for this Court a broad power which
we are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise." 44 It is
surprising that, in today's climate, these sentiments are considered controversiaL
Some time ago, a Peanuts comic strip showed Snoopy, the
dog, looking at Charlie Brown and Linus. Snoopy thinks to
himself: "I wonder why some of us are born dogs and others
are born people. Is it just chance, or what is it? Somehow the
whole thing just seems unfair." Then Snoopy concludes: "Why
should I have been the lucky one?"
That is a question we should ask. Why are we the lucky ones?
We have been very fortunate to have a Supreme Court to help
preserve our constitutional rights. Hopefully, our luck will hold
out. We all recognize that the Court has sometimes engaged in
excesses. Nevertheless, this nation is 'fortunate to have a
Supreme Court that is the final arbiter acting to preserve our
constitutional rights. Academic commentary should be acting
to divert the Court away from the uncharted expanse of the
"unwritten Constitution." Unfortunately, the pressure of much
current academic commentary is in exactly the opposite direction. That is not good for the long-term health of the Court.
We will not always be the lucky ones.

43. Justice William Brennan, quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 36, col. 2.
44. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,70 (1947) (Black,J,joined by Douglas,].,
dissenting); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76-87 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).

